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The English language literature on Japanese intelligence and on that country's 
involvement in economic espionage is relatively sparse. What exists may be divided into 
four general categories: a few full-length historical treatments that examine components 
of the overall system,1 some comparative studies of foreign intelligence that contrast the 
structure and functions of Japan's intelligence community with those of other countries,2 
several historical assessments of intelligence activities during the Second World War 
from both the Allied3 and Japanese perspectives4, and a few recent analyses of Japan's 
involvement in economic espionage.5  
Given the paucity of material and the lack of a comprehensive study, the recent addition 
of James Hansen's Japanese Intelligence: The Competitive Edge is, therefore, to be 
welcomed. However, when serving intelligence officers or former employees of 
intelligence agencies publish material, a note of caution should be sounded that leads 
readers to ponder the possible motives involved. In the past, some commentaries have 
been intended to set the record straight or to respond to critics of intelligence. Similarly, 
others have offered criticism of existing or former intelligence practices. Sometimes this 
has been the result of a change of heart. On other occasions, it has been driven by a desire 
to improve the quality of intelligence. In Hansen's case, there appear to be two principal 
underlying rationales. The first is to broaden awareness of the threat posed by Japan to 
US economic interests from his vantage point as a counter-intelligence specialist. The 
second concerns his belief that the Japanese intelligence system provides a model for the 
twenty-first century that deserves emulation. In order to assess the value of Japanese 
Intelligence: The Competitive Edge, it is necessary to take account of both recent changes 
in American intelligence policy and new definitions of national security in that country, 
and to consider the work within the wider context of the extant literature.  
From the end of the Second World War until 1990, Western intelligence agencies focused 
their attention, arguably to the detriment of other targets, on the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states. With the end of the Cold War, they have had to justify both their 
continued existence and their extensive budgets. As part of this justification process they 
have looked further afield for new threats and opportunities, and have even focused their 
attention on some that pre-existed the Soviet Union's demise. In the United States where 
such soul searching has been particularly extensive, economic espionage has moved from 
being considered a minor problem to one claiming centre stage. Though not singled out 
as the only protagonist among the United States's military allies, Japan has been 
demonized more than most.  
This state of affairs did not come about overnight. Over a period of approximately 35 
years Japan moved from being a defeated enemy with an economy in ruins, to new-found 
ally, to being the primary economic threat to the United States. By 1980, this economic 
miracle had garnered, to the envy of many trading partners, a balance of trade surplus for 
Japan of some $75 billion. And it had been done in a country with few natural resources 
and a population half the size of the United States packed into a land base barely the size 
of Montana. Given such dramatic economic growth, economists forecasted that its 
economy would surpass that of the United States and have the highest gross national 
product by the end of the millennium.6 However, the success of Japanese industry at 
dominating one sector after another led American management specialists initially not to 
chastize the Japanese for their success but to advocate the emulation of the Japanese 
corporate model by US companies.7  
Despite the fact that the US Intelligence Community was otherwise preoccupied in the 
1970s and 1980s with military affairs, the significance of Japan's industrial success and 
the threat posed by economic espionage generally did not go completely unnoticed.8 A 
1987 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report entitled Japan: Foreign Intelligence and 
Security Services estimated that a full 80 percent of Japan's intelligence efforts were 
concentrated on economic targets  especially those of a technological nature  in Western 
Europe and the United States.9 With the end of the Cold War, new attitudes toward Japan 
came to the fore. From having companies worthy of emulation, the country now came to 
be seen by some as the new international bogeyman bent on economic domination. This 
new stance was epitomized by a report entitled Japan: 2000, which was made possible by 
financial support from the CIA.10 This saw an inevitable Japanese victory unless there 
was "some dramatic unified re-assertion of Western intent coupled with an equally 
dramatic and focused economic resurgence."11 According to the views of the authors, 
from which the CIA subsequently distanced itself, Japan differed "not just on the margins 
but represent[ed] an incompatible paradigm incapable and unwilling to change or 
converge."12 As such it posed a threat not just to Western capitalism but to the entire 
value system on which the Western paradigm was based. In language that did little to 
disguise its use of racial stereotypes, the report described the vast majority of Japanese 
"as a people . . . driven by pride, nationalism and down-right irrationality" and as 
"creatures of an ageless, amoral, manipulative and controlling culture."13  
About the same time the US Intelligence Community undertook a review of American 
policy toward economic intelligence gathering. This identified a number of philosophical 
and practical problems associated with sharing the intelligence product broadly with 
American industry. Not the least of these were the likelihood of breaching anti-trust laws 
and the dilemma of which companies to define as being truly American in nature.14 
Despite these reservations about US government involvement in industrial espionage, the 
issue was further examined when the presidency changed hands in the early 1990s. 
During the confirmation process, James Woolsey, the new Director of the CIA, claimed it 
had become "the hottest topic in intelligence policy."15 By 1995, the Clinton 
administration had issued new national security strategies that focused on economic 
security. These saw it as now being an integral component of both the US national 
interest and national security.16 A further ramification of this policy shift was the legal 
requirement now placed on presidents to submit an assessment of foreign economic 
collection and industrial espionage to Congress on an annual basis. Similarly, it is 
believed that President Clinton has also issued a classified set of intelligence priorities 
that emphasize economic espionage.17  
Given recent revelations that the CIA has targeted such allies as France and Japan, many 
have questioned whether the Agency should be involved in economic intelligence 
gathering. For some critics the answer regarding American participation is clear cut. For 
instance, Robert Norton has suggested that in the case of automobile sales "the Big Three 
don't need spooks trying to infiltrate the Japanese government. The intelligence they need 
is more basic, such as the insight that you should put the steering wheel on the right-hand 
side of the car if you expect to sell it in Japan  something the US carmakers are only 
beginning to do."18  
On the other side of the ledger, there is growing evidence from both the private and 
public sectors that US industries are under threat. In 1996, the American Society for 
Industrial Security  admittedly an interested party  completed a study of intellectual 
property theft and corporate espionage among 325 US corporations.19 This indicated that 
reported incidents had increased by 323 percent since 1992. In addition, the data 
collected supported the US counterintelligence community's views about the countries 
most actively involved in targeting US interests.20 In its most recent report to Congress, 
the National Counterintelligence Center has asserted that there are now at least twelve 
countries that are actively targeting US proprietary economic information and critical 
technologies. Apparently, these countries "have shown a particular determination, and in 
most cases a willingness to use illegal and covert means, to collect US economic and 
technological information."21  
It may be argued that there are two central questions to be asked of American 
interpretations of contemporary Japanese intelligence. These are: do they provide a 
balanced view of the subject? do they add in a significant way to the understanding 
already provided by the existing intelligence literature?  
Hansen's book may be divided into three roughly equal components and a conclusion. 
The first section summarizes the historical and cultural contexts in which modern 
Japanese intelligence is rooted. Its purpose is to show that the contemporary intelligence 
system is either a reflection of, or a reaction to, major historical events or "cultural keys." 
In developing this argument, the author is more successful at showing how the 
contemporary system emphasizing economic intelligence represents a discontinuity from 
the past than connecting the earlier events and keys to it. As he and others have posited, 
Japanese intelligence during the Second World War was at times naive. The 
contemporary system attempts not to be. Similarly, the previous incarnation was 
militaristic while the current one is consistent with the restraints of the new constitution. 
The historical section is, therefore, of mixed value. While the author makes effective use 
of, for example, declassified US documents covering Japanese intelligence during the 
Second World War, his assessment of the earlier period relies heavily on the work of 
Richard Deacon. This, as others have noted, contains many unsupported assertions. 
Given the author's claims to have knowledge of Japanese, it is difficult to understand why 
Japanese historical scholarship was not considered or incorporated.  
The second section comprised of four chapters lays out the structure of contemporary 
Japanese intelligence. While the latter three chapters describe the crucial involvement of 
the private sector by concentrating on the role of research institutes and trading 
companies, the first covers the government structure. It focuses on the role of the Cabinet 
Office staff, the ministries of International Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs, and 
Finance as well as military intelligence. An obvious omission from this section is the role 
of the Ministry of Justice in providing domestic security and collecting security 
intelligence. As a result, the national police who fall under its jurisdiction  most 
particularly the Public Security Investigation Bureau  are not discussed at all.22 Given the 
foreign intelligence role that some security intelligence services play  particularly in 
countries where there is no foreign intelligence service  this is not insignificant. The 
picture painted by the author of the Cabinet Research Office is also neither up-to-date nor 
entirely accurate. Initially formed in 1952, the PRO was renamed the Cabinet Information 
Research Office (CIRO) as part of the general restructuring of the Cabinet Secretariat that 
occurred in the mid-1980s with a view to improving the central coordination of 
government.23 That review was specifically responsible for improvements in the way 
intelligence was assessed and distributed. It also led to the purchase of new 
communications and eavesdropping technologies and to improvements in the committee 
system for establishing intelligence policy and collection requirements.24 The author 
claims that "the CRO (sic) is unique in the importance it enjoys for so small an 
organization." (p. 66) While Americans used to large assessment groups within individual 
collection agencies may find the CIRO small, those familiar with cabinet government in 
parliamentary democracies will not. Canada's Privy Council Office, for example, is 
similar in size to Japan's Cabinet Secretarat and contains similar units that specialize in 
developing and coordinating security and intelligence policy or provide a centralized 
intelligence assessment function. The senior official responsible for those organizations is 
also responsible for overall SIGINT policy and direction. While Australia differs slightly 
in having a small, specialized assessment unit, the Office of National Assessments, which 
is detached from its cabinet structure but also reports directly to the prime minister, the 
United Kingdom has an equally, small centralized system. There are reasons why these 
bodies are kept small and rely on seconded staff as Michael Herman, a former Secretary 
to Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee, has recently made clear. On the Cabinet Office 
Assessment Staff, which provides intelligence for Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the 
body ultimately responsible for directing and coordinating British intelligence, he has 
observed:  
Important as JIC assessments are, the actual resources needed for them are quite small. 
Talent is what counts, and there is a positive advantage in keeping the numbers low. 
Since 1968 the Assessments Staff as the kernel of the JIC process has been staffed with a 
strength of perhaps twenty-five secondees including a strong element from the FCO.25
Other aspects that are underplayed include intelligence sharing arrangements, particularly 
those with UKUSA Agreement states, and the significance of US bases in Japan for US 
intelligence, especially regarding SIGINT.26 It was, in fact, long delays in receiving 
intelligence during the Gulf War, which exposed Japan's heavy reliance on Western-
sourced intelligence, that led to the establishment of the new Defence Intelligence 
Headquarters staffed by some 1600 civilian and military personnel in 1996.27 The section 
also fails to inform readers how government institutions are controlled and held 
accountable, whether they are reviewed or not, and if they have statutory mandates. Also, 
there is no indication of the attitudes currently held by the Japanese themselves toward 
such government institutions and their functions in the light of past practices and the 
current non-militarist constitution.  
The third major component of the book provides an analysis of how Japanese intelligence 
currently operates. The central argument of the section is that Japan "had a 1990s-style 
intelligence system long before the 1990s arrived." (p. 117) Here the author falls into the 
trap of looking at Japan's existing intelligence system from the perspective of recent 
shifts in American intelligence policy, i.e., one moving from a primarily military 
definition of national security to an economic one, not from the consistent needs of 
Japanese policy makers since the Second World War. Despite the infelicity, this section 
of Hansen's book is by far the most useful as it stresses certain things that some Cold 
Warriors have difficulty in understanding about the directions that intelligence should 
take. One is the singular importance and abundance of open sourced intelligence 
generally. A second is the significance of so-called "grey information" to strategic 
decision-making in the economic sphere. Another is the wide distribution of finished 
intelligence to those who can use it regardless of whether they are members of the private 
sector or not.28 However, the discussion of business intelligence that follows illustrates 
the potential dangers that can befall intelligence officers looking for a new raison d'etre. 
Though the components of business intelligence (BI) are correctly identified, they are 
treated as if they have just been discovered by American industry. Though a popular 
assertion nowadays by former intelligence officers looking for new careers, this is far 
from the truth. In the 1960s, North America was a Mecca for those who wanted to 
understand modern marketing techniques. The lessons imparted there focused specifically 
on such matters as the need to understand the market, the nature of the competition, the 
search for unique selling propositions and individual product advantages, and, above all, 
knowing the consumer. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States became a leader in 
developing sophisticated methods or collecting and analysing marketing data and 
incorporating their implications into the corporate strategic planning process. Suggesting, 
however, that "there are hardly any BI courses in American business schools and the 
study of BI has hardly gotten off the ground" (p.132) is to reveal an intelligence failure. 
The function and the teaching of business intelligence is merely conducted under 
different cover. Many American corporations are among the most skilful in the world at 
using "market research" and interpreting the data collected strategically. That some 
groups, like the US automakers discussed above, lost or never fully acquired a consumer-
oriented focus until they were forced to do so by their Japanese competitors, says more 
about the corporate cultures of individual companies, the backgrounds and orientation of 
their leadership, and even the significance of export markets, or lack thereof, to them than 
about American industry per se.  
In the final analysis, Japanese Intelligence: The Competitive Edge must be said to have 
its flaws. Scholars will likely find it inadequate, too reliant on the opinions of others, and 
lacking a sufficiently critical eye on the part of the author. Many may wish that original 
research could have been used to provide clearer evidence of the degree to which 
Japanese intelligence helped Japanese companies catch up and leap past their 
competition. However, for the newcomer it provides a useful introduction to the field that 
alerts readers to the broader literature. And significantly, it does put important issues on 
the table.  
Stuart Farson  
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